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Injuries From Fright Without Contact
Larry Grean*
The Mephistophelian power of a rigid rule . . . is often en-
countered in tort law. A pernicious example of such a me-
chanical rule is the so-called "impact" requirement in fright
and shock cases.'
M ENTAL DISTRESS SITUATIONS occur throughout the field of
torts in cases ranging from assault and trespass to seduc-
tion, false arrest, slander, malicious prosecution, and others.
They occur in intentional and unintentional situations, and in
cases where there is willful and wanton negligence. There may
be mental distress over one's own predicament or over fear for
the safety of a third party. Physical injuries may or may not re-
sult from the mental distress and the element of "impact" (con-
temporaneous physical injury) becomes an additional factor to
consider. However, when it comes to the question of recovery
for either mental distress alone or physical injuries resulting
therefrom, in cases of negligence, the law is still unsettled.2
This note will focus on the mental distress situation where
a recovery is sought for injuries resulting from fright without
"impact" (contemporaneous physical injury).3 Two 1965 cases,
one in Delaware4 and the other in New Jersey5 are clearly
illustrative.
In Robb v. PennsylvaniaO the female plaintiff's auto stalled
on the defendant's railroad tracks because a rut had negligently
been allowed to form. While she was attempting to move the
auto, defendant's train approached. The plaintiff fortunately
* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; Second-Year Student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injury, 41 B. U. L. Rev. 584 (1961).
2 Prosser, Torts 346 (3rd Ed. 1964). "One interest which is still a subject of
controversy is that in freedom from mental disturbance. No general agree-
ment has yet been reached as to the liability for negligence resulting in
fright, shock, or other 'mental suffering' or its physical consequences."
3 See 64 A. L. R. 2d 100-151 (1959); 52 Am. Jur. 388-431 for good discussion.
4 Robb v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 210 A. 2d 709 (Del. 1965).
5 Falzone v. Busch, 45 N. J. 559, 214 A. 2d 12 (1965). This overrules Ward
v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 65 N. J. L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
6 Supra note 4.
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escaped being struck by the train, but was so badly frightened
that physical illness developed as a result.7
In Falzone v. Busch8 the plaintiff was sitting in her auto
when the defendant, through his negligent driving, careened his
car towards hers, barely avoiding a collision. Just before this
happened the defendant had struck the plaintiff's husband, an
event which she witnessed. Plaintiff was affected by this, as well
as being placed in fear for her own safety. In allowing recovery
the court stressed the fact that she was in the "danger zone" and
that she suffered physical injuries from the fright.9
Both courts stated that upon adequate proof of injuries the
plaintiffs could recover even though they received no "impact."
They felt that the "impact rule" was antiquated, and discredited
it as having no applicability in a proper determination of whether
recovery should be allowed.
Although the fact situations are different, these two cases
present important similarities that should be kept in mind when
one is dealing with this type of fright case:
1. The plaintiffs were females (this seems to be so in the
majority of mental injury cases).
2. The defendants were negligent (ordinary negligence).
3. The plaintiffs were in the immediate zone of danger.
4. The plaintiffs were not touched in any way.
5. The plaintiffs were frightened and claimed bodily injuries
as a result of that fright.
The reasoning behind these decisions to allow recovery for
injuries from fright in absence of any "impact" will become clear
as this note progresses. It is important to note that these two
cases add to the weight of jurisdictions that have eliminated the
"impact" requirement. Prosser's prophecy that this rule is "des-
tined for ultimate extinction" 10 has been pushed a few steps
closer to fulfillment.
7 Robb v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., supra note 4, at 710, "... the plaintiff
was greatly frightened and emotionally disturbed by the accident as the re-
sult of which she sustained shock to her nervous system. The fright and
nervous shock resulted in physical injuries including cessation of lacta-
tion . .
8 Supra note 5.
9 Falzone v. Busch, supra note 5, at 13. "As a direct result she became ill
and required medical attention."





In an early American case'1 the plaintiff (female) was negli-
gently put off the defendant's train beyond her station. The re-
sult was "anxiety and suspense of mind" 12 causing injuries to
her health. Recovery was denied on the theory that if fright
caused by negligence was not actionable, the consequences of
such fright similarly were not actionable.
A few years later, when the English courts were faced with
the same problem in Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coul-
tas,13 they set forth principles for denying recovery that were
subsequently followed in some jurisdictions in the United States.
Several years later the Victorian case was overruled in Eng-
land; 14 but unfortunately its impact remained in America. The
Victorian case stated that there could be no recovery for injuries
resulting from fright unless there was "impact" (contempora-
neous physical injury), the reasoning being that:
1. There was no precedent in English law.
2. Damages are too remote and physical injuries are not the
ordinary consequences of fright.
3. Problems of proof would be too difficult.
4. There would be an increase in litigation accompanied by
many fictitious claims.
In 1890 the American case of Hill v. Kimball 5 allowed re-
covery for injuries from fright resulting from defendant's negli-
gence (almost willful and wanton). There, the court recognized
that a causal relation existed between the fright and the physical
injuries which occurred. 16 Other jurisdictions were soon to fol-
11 Trigg v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 74 Mo. 147, 41 Am. Rep. 305 (1881).
12 Id. at 148.
13 (1883)'13 App. Cas. 222, overruled by Dulieu v. White & Sons (1901) 2
K. B. 669. In the Victorian case the plaintiff (female) and her husband
came to the defendant's railway crossing. Defendant's employee negligently
let them pass while a train approached. They narrowly escaped but plain-
tiff was severely shocked with the result that her health and memory were
impaired plus a resulting injury to her eyesight. Recovery denied.
14 In Dulieu v. White, supra note 13, the plaintiff (female) suffered a mis-
carriage as a result of fright when the defendant's van was negligently
driven into a room where she was sitting. Recovery was allowed and the
"impact rule" was finished in England. See note 3, 64 A. L. R. 2d 145.
15 76 Tex. Rep. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890).
16 Id. at 59. "That a physical personal injury may be produced through a
strong emotion of the mind there can be no doubt."
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low in allowing recovery;1" but the weight of the Victorian case
was felt in three landmark American cases decided some time
after.
Ewing v. Pittsburgh,"8 Mitchell v. Rochester) and Spade v.
Lynn20 reflected the influence of the Victorian case and devel-
oped the "impact" philosophy in this country.21 These cases con-
tain the notable similarities of Robb and Falzone cases mentioned
above, and follow the reasoning of the Victorian case.
The Ewing case, in denying recovery, held that the injuries
were too remote and not foreseeable, and accordingly did not
meet the court's idea of "proximate cause":
In determining what is proximate cause, the true rule is that
the injury must be the natural and probable consequence
of the negligence; such a consequence as, under the sur-
rounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have
been seen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act.22
The Mitchell case denied recovery on these grounds:
1. Since no recovery could be allowed for mere fright, there
could be no recovery for its consequences.
2. The miscarriage was not the proximate result of the de-
fendant's negligence but came about by other circum-
stances.
17 Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892);
Sloane v. Southern California Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); Mack
v. South-Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1898); Kimberly v. How-
land, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906); Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co.,
111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688 (1909); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala.
App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); O'Meara v. Russel, 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550
(1916).
18 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892). Through defendant's negligent act the plain-
tiff (female) became "sick and disabled, and continued to be sick and dis-
abled from attending to her usual work and duties, and suffered and con-
tinues to suffer great mental and physical pain and anguish, and is thereby
permanently weakened and disabled."
19 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896) overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N. Y.
2d 237, 219 N. Y. S. 2d 34, 176 N. E. 2d 729 (1961).
20 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
21 Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., supra note 5; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co.
v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226 (1901); Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R.
Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499 (1908); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich.
157, 192 N. W. 652 (1923); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So.
2d 154 (1963). Here the court would allow recovery only when there was
gross or malicious negligence.




3. Recovery without "impact" would be contrary to public
policy. Injuries could be feigned and the courts would
be flooded with litigation.
4. Damages would be too hard to determine.
The Spade case recognized that injuries could flow from
fright;2 3 but decided against recovery on the ground that if such
injuries were actionable, then recovery for fright must be per-
mitted. This they did not wish to permit and avoided this prob-
lem by invoking the "impact" rule.
The logical vindication of this rule is that it is unreasonable
to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to antici-
pate and guard against fright and the consequences of fright,
and that this would open the door for unjust claims which
could not successfully be met.24
The Why and Meaning of Impact
It is not difficult to imagine the predicament of early judges
who were called upon to decide mental injury claims. Medical
knowledge had not come very far in the area of mental distress
and its consequences. There was little "expert" testimony avail-
able. The possibility of fictitious claims was an important factor
for disallowing recovery. However, instead of resting their rea-
soning on the lack of medical knowledge, the courts went astray
in trying to find reasons for denying recovery.
In attempting to rationalize the "impact" rule, the causal re-
lation is not much help because courts have allowed recovery
where the impact was not substantial, 25 or where the impact oc-
curred after the fright.26 The majority of courts merely demand
23 Supra note 20, at 89.
24 Ibid.
25 Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902)
(slight blow against a seat); Her emotional reactions produced physical
injuries. Porter v. Delaware, L & W. R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 A. 860(1906). Through the defendant's negligence a bridge with an engine on it
fell nearly hitting the plaintiff (female). Dust from the crash got into her
eye. This was held to be sufficient for an "impact." Christy Bros. Circus v.
Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S. E. 680 (1928). Here the "impact" was no
more than a horse of the defendant's "evacuating" his bowels into the plain-
tiff's lap. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N. E. 869 (1930) (inhalation
of smoke). Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. St. 312, 175 A. 2d 351 (1961):
"Where it is definitely established that injury and suffering were proxi-
mately caused by an act of negligence and any degree of physical impact,
however slight, can be shown . ... "
26 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431, 76 A. L. R. 676 (1931).
After the occurrence of fright, the plaintiff (female) fainted and fell frac-
turing her skull.
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that the impact occur and do not look at its magnitude or exam-
ine the question of whether the impact caused the injury. The
rule appears to be merely a superficial device to cover up judi-
cial uncertainty.
Rejection of Impact
As indicated above, the necessity of a contemporaneous
physical impact was not accepted in all jurisdictions.2 7 The idea
that since there could be no recovery for fright alone the conse-
quences would not be actionable 28 was rejected on the ground
that the consequences are different from fright.29 The theory be-
ing that they are an injury to the body and should be afforded
redress as are other types of bodily injury. The idea that public
policy should stand in the way of recovery because a flood of
litigation would erupt3 ° was rejected 3' on the basis that, where
a material injury can be shown, justice should prevail. The
actual flood has never materialized, there being more litigation
in states that follow the Mitchell case. 32 Difficulty of proof and
fear of imaginary and fictitious claims 33 gave way on the grounds
that these are not sound principles of law for denying a legal
remedy.34 The proximate cause argument, which denied liability
because of the so-called "remoteness" of the injury,3 5 gave way
to the idea that the negligence, fright, and resulting injury run
in an unbroken chain.3 6 In a 1916 case37 where the court grap-
pled with causation, they stated:
Are damages the proximate result of the negligence or of
the fright? The primary cause is none the less the proximate
cause because it happens to operate through successive in-
27 Supra note 17. Also see 52 Am. Jur. 388.
28 Mitchell v. Rochester, supra note 19.
29 Purcell v. St. Paul, supra note 17.
30 Mitchell v. Rochester, supra note 19; Miller v. Baltimore, supra, note 21.
31 Mack v. South-Bound, supra note 17; Green v. Shoemaker, supra note
17.
32 Lambert, op. cit. supra note 1 at 592.
33 Mitchell v. Rochester, supra note 19; Spade v. Lynn, supra note 20.
34 Alabama Fuel & Iron v. Baladoni, supra note 17.
35 Ewing v. Pittsburgh, supra note 18.
36 Hill v. Kimball, supra note 15; Sloane v. Southern California, supra note
17; Kimberly v. Howland, supra note 17; Green v. Shoemaker, supra note
17.




strumentalities; that is to say, where the injury naturally
and probably ensues in unbroken sequence, uninfluenced or
uncontrolled by an independent, intervening, efficient cause,
the injury is referred to the primary as the proximate
cause.
38
A majority of the states that have ruled on this question
allow recovery for physical injuries resulting from fright without
contact. Since the turn of the century, with the increase in med-
ical knowledge, the "impact rule" has seen a steady decline. 39
There are, however, those few jurisdictions which still cling to
the past and cannot seem to rid themselves of this legal stumbling
block. Ohio,40 Pennsylvania 41 and Massachusetts 42 are notable
examples of these.
The reasoning of the Victorian case is only partly followed.
Two years after the Spade case in Massachusetts another case in
that jurisdiction explained that the real reason for denying re-
covery could not be found in logic but out of practical necessity. 43
Only recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Bosley v.
Andrews, 44 reaffirmed its original position in the Ewing case,
cited Huston v. Borough of Freemansburgh.45 Here the court
placed the emphasis on public policy as a reason for denying
recovery. It's obvious from the decision that the court arbitrarily
refused to re-examine its former position, even though the case
contained clearly proved elements of negligence, resulting fright
and physical injury, and though denial of recovery worked a real
hardship on the plaintiff. Precedent was the key, whether good
or bad.
38 Id. at 207.
39 Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929);
Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934); Orlo v.
Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402 (1941); Battalla v. State, supra
note 19; Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955)
(cert. den. 1956), 350 U. S. 947, 76 S. Ct. 321; Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d
594, 85 N. W. 2d 345 (1957); Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (D. C. Va.
1960); Robb v. Pennsylvania Rail Co., supra note 4; Falzone v. Busch, supra
note 5.
40 Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., supra note 21.
41 Ewing v. Pittsburgh R. Co., supra note 18.
42 Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., supra note 20.
43 Smith v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N. E. 380 (1899).
44 Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A. 2d 263 (1958). Defendant's bull
chased plaintiff (female) and almost ran her down. She collapsed and had
an attack of coronary insufficiency. Since the bull did not touch her recov-
ery was denied. Note the dissent by Musmanno, J.
45 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905).
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In the Falzone and Robb cases the courts clearly faced their
responsibilities and recognized that injuries could result from
fright. Fictitious claims and difficulties of proof would be prob-
lems, but to deny recovery on these grounds alone would be to
commit injustice. The tremendous advances in medicine have
greatly decreased these possibilities, and medical expert opin-
ion, 46 once non-existent, is now readily available.
47
Causation
In many of the early cases recovery was denied because any
injuries resulting from fright were thought of as too remote or
not foreseeable; 48 and yet, where there was "impact," even
though it might not be a direct cause of the fright, the result was
different.49 Add to this the fact that in most cases of the type
being discussed, substantial injuries occur only in persons who
have "pre-existing impairments" or "subnormal resistance" r0
and one is left with doubts about a proper formula for causation.
To help lift the confusion let us suppose, through a hypo-
thetical example, that defendant negligently loses control of his
car while driving downtown.51 What will probably happen? No
doubt he will lose control of his vehicle or fail to stop for a light
or a stop sign. Next, suppose the car smashes into another car
or a utility pole. There is also a chance that the auto will run
46 Falzone v. Busch, supra note 5 at 14. "The Court (Ward v. West Jersey
& S. R. Co., supra note 5) there first stated that it is not 'probable or nat-
ural' for persons of normal health to suffer physical injuries when subjected
to fright, and that since a person whose acts cause fright alone could not
reasonably anticipate that physical harm would follow, such acts cannot
constitute negligence as to the frightened party. It appears that the court
decided as a matter of law an issue which we believe is properly determin-
able by medical evidence." (emphasis added).
47 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease. Note, Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1943); Smith & Soloman, Traumatic
Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943); Smith, Problems of Proof in
Psychic Injury Cases, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 586 (1963); Keschner, Stimula-
tion of Nervous and Mental Disease, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 715 (1946); Havard,
Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 Mod. L. Rev. 478 (1956); Cantor,
Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 Clev.-Mar. L.
Rev. 428 (1957); Wasmuth, Psychosomatic Disease and the Law, 7 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 34 (1958); Symposium on Mental Injury Damages, 15 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 1-57 (1966).
48 64 A. L. R. 2d 100 (1959).
49 Comstock v. Wilson, supra note 26.
50 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:, supra note 47 at 285.
51 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49




a pedestrian down or even come very close. This person might
be scared to such an extent that injuries are suffered; or he
might be an individual with some pre-existing impairment which
is aggravated or worsened by the ordeal.
The first question that must be asked is about duty. The
defendant has a clear duty to drive his car safely and not sub-
ject others to the hazards of unsafe driving.52 The duty extends
to those who might be endangered; 53 those in the "zone" of risk.
The next question is that of proximation. Was there a "continu-
ous sequence" unbroken by any independent cause? If the chain
is not broken, then the defendant's breach of duty is complete. 54
When dealing with the "idiosyncratic plaintiff," there is no
problem and the defendant cannot limit his liability because of
idiosyncrasies on the theory that the normal person would have
been affected less.55 The average person of normal health56 is the
standard to be used insofar as the "duty" relation goes; and
when a defendant has done an act that he could foresee as en-
dangering a normal person of average health, the fact that the
plaintiff turns out to have some pre-existing infirmity will be of
no avail; he must take his victim as he finds him.57
52 McCormick, Damages. § 74 at 264, 265 (1935); Smith, Relation of Emo-
tions to Injury and Disease:, supra note 47, at 305.
53 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1136 (1956). "The view currently prevailing in
this country, however, does limit the scope of duty to do or refrain from
doing a given act to (1) those persons or interests that are likely to be en-
dangered by the act or omission, and (2) harm (to such person or interest)
from a risk the likelihood of which made the act or omission negligent."
Robb. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., supra note 4; Falzone v. Busch, supra
note 5.
54 1 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, § 34 at 92 (1941). Also see Prosser,
op. cit. supra note 2, Chapter 9, Proximate Causation.
55 Amdursky, The Interest In Mental Tranquillity, 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 339
at 352 (1963-4).
56 Id. at 352, 353. Also see Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Dis-
ease, supra note 47 at 305; Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2 at 352.
57 Amdursky, supra note 55, at 352, 353; Also see Hill v. Kimball, supra
note 15 (miscarriage); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., supra note 17
(miscarriage); Sloane v. Southern California Ry. Co., supra note 17 (Re-
currence of insomnia and paroxysms); Kimberly v. Howland, supra note 17
(miscarriage); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, supra note 17 (mis-
carriage); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 39 (a condition of diabetes
and arteriosclerosis was aggravated by the fright); Kaufman v. Western
Union Tel. Co., supra note 39 (P. had high blood pressure and a "sensitive
nervous temperament"); Colla v. Mandella, supra note 39 (Plaintiff was
suffering from a mild heart ailment. When the crash occurred the fright
caused heart failure and resulted in death); Penick v. Mirro, supra note 39
(aggravation of an old arthritic condition).
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But when the act or omission is negligence as to any and all
passengers, well or ill, any one injured by the negligence
must be entitled to recover to the full extent of the injury so
caused, without regard to whether, owing to his previous
condition of health, he is more or less liable to injury.58
A proper formula for liability in this general type of case
would appear to include the following elements:
1. Ordinary negligence of the defendant.
2. Presence of plaintiff in the "zone of danger."
3. Fright and resulting physical injuries with no interven-
ing cause.
4. Presence of pre-existing injury is immaterial.
Medical Problem
Unfortunately, medical knowledge in this area has lagged
behind the development of legal principles. Nevertheless many
of the early courts did not let this factor stand in the way. They
saw the causal relation between fright and the resulting inju-
ries,5 9 although sometimes in their attempts to understand the
relation, erroneous assumptions were made.60 Those courts deny-
ing recovery felt that medical proof was inadequate to warrant
a recovery, an assumption that was correct;6 ' but, instead of
stopping here, they confused things by relying on the "impact"
theory.
In a remarkable and thorough study of fright cases from
1850 to 1944, Smith6 2 came up with some very important obser-
vations:
5s Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., supra note 17, at 1035. See also Orlo v.
Connecticut Co., supra note 39, at 404, where the court said: "The ultimate
test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that
harm may result if it is not exercised .... By that is not meant that one
charged with negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the prob-
ability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foresee-
able, but the test is, would the ordinary man in the defendant's position,
knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the
general nature of that suffered was likely to result?"
59 Mack v. South-Bound R. Co., supra note 17, at 909; Kimberly v. How-
land, supra note 17, at 780; Sloane v. Southern California Ry. Co., supra
note 17.
60 Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, op. cit. supra note 47,
at 212 criticizes the Sloane case for assuming that nervous shock involves
a direct physical injury to the nerves.
61 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, op. cit. supra note 47,
at 285.




1. The earlier courts were justified in denying recovery on
the grounds that adequate medical proof was lacking.6 3
2. The law departed from science and in effect did injustice.
If those courts that allowed recovery for injuries from
fright had denied recovery, then more justice would have
been done this way.6 4
3. Fright does not usually produce physical injuries in an
average person.
65
4. In the majority of cases studied the injured party had
some pre-existing infirmity.66
The value in this study and the observations made help to
relate the meaning of the gap that existed between the law and
science. We can better understand the fears that existed about
the possible increase in fictitious claims if recovery were to be
allowed. Today these possibilities have been greatly minimized
through medical science's abilities in detection.6 7
A continuing problem that will have to be dealt with is the
occurrence of non-willful exaggeration of symptoms and dis-
abilities. The problem exists when litigation is imminent, more
than when it is not.68
These apprehensions about the oncoming trial are due par-
tially to fears that their injury will be disbelieved or held
in contempt for want of objective lesions. Also, the self-
serving mechanisms involved in neurosis invariably cause
some degree of unconscious exaggeration or malingering in
respect to symptoms, as the neurotic desires to be believed
and wants his complaints to be convincing. Suggestions
made by relatives and lawyers and the continuance of dis-
ability payments are additional extrinsic factors which cause
neurotic symptoms to be aggravated or exaggerated. 69
63 Id. at 285.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 302. See also Havard, supra note 47 at 482. "The consensus of
modern medical opinion is that lasting damage does not occur in 'normal'
individuals as a result of emotional shock, however severe."
66 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, op. cit. supra note 47,
at 303.
67 Cantor, op. cit. supra note 47, at 435, 436, 437.
68 Keschner, op. cit. supra note 47, at 718.
69 Smith & Soloman, op. cit. supra note 47, at 125.
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When litigation is over many of these symptoms will dis-
appear.
70
It is understandable that if the courts are to allow recovery
for the injuries from fright they should be shown that the claim-
ant was really injured. The importance of the medical examiner
cannot be overlooked for it will largely depend on him to pro-
vide the answers. Through his examination of the claimant he
will be able to pick out the signs and symptoms.71 The signs are
objective and through examination techniques they can be de-
tected regardless of any statement from the claimant. Symp-
toms, on the other hand, are subjective and only known to the
patient. Here, the problems of proof become extremely difficult.
Complications will increase when the courts are faced with
situations where the complainant claims that the fright has pro-
duced headaches, loss of appetite, nervousness, etc. Can these
come under the heading of true physical injuries? 72 Unfortu-
nately medical science cannot supply all the answers in mental
injury cases. 73 Much has been learned about fright and its con-
sequences but even today medical testimony is often no more
than medical judgment.7 4
Most courts allowing recovery for physical injuries resulting
from fright, where there has been ordinary negligence, will not
grant recovery for mere fright alone.75 They feel that fright is
70 Id.
71 Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, op. cit. supra note 47,
at 593.
72 64 A. L. R. 2d 100 (1959).
73 Wasmuth, op. cit. supra note 47, at 49; Smith, Problems of Proof in Psy-
chic Injury Cases, supra note 47, at 604. "While one must be circumspect
and guarded in trying to determine what is only hypothesis and what is
demonstrable clinical fact, if there is substantial evidence of causal con-
nection, there should be no resentment on the part of the defendant, or so-
ciety, if the claimant seeks and obtains compensation."
74 Wasmuth, op. cit. supra, note 47 at 35.
75 Kimberly v. Howland, supra note 17; Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co.,
supra note 17; Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951) at 927
"... clearly apparent and substantial physical injury as manifested by an
external condition or symptom clearly indicative of a resultant pathological,
physiological, or mental state"; Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, supra
note 17, at 207 where the court says: "Damages, when confined to fright
alone, is dealing with a metaphysical, as contradistinguished from a physi-
cal, condition, with something subjective instead of objective, and entirely
within the realm of speculation." O'Meara v. Russel, supra note 17; Penick
v. Mirro, supra note 39 at 947; Robb v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., supra note




too subjective in nature and is dependent upon the uncorrob-
orated statements of the claimant.
Where the defendant's negligence causes only mental dis-
turbance, without accompanying physical injury or physical
consequences, or any independent basis for tort liability,
there is still general agreement that in the ordinary case
there can be no recovery.76
In the Falzone case 77 the court said that "fright is too lack-
ing in seriousness and too speculative to warrant imposition of
liability where it does not cause substantial bodily injury or sick-
ness." In the Robb case 78 it was stated that ". . . it is accepted as
settled that there can be no recovery for fright alone, not leading
to bodily injury or sickness, arising from the negligence of an-
other."
Conclusion
Where the plaintiff can clearly prove in court, through med-
ical testimony, that physical injuries were caused by fright in a
case of ordinary negligence, recovery should be allowed. To deny
this on the basis of the reasoning behind the "impact rule" is to
do injustice to the aggrieved party. There are, however, those
jurisdictions that still adhere to the old rule, and it can only be
hoped that they will strike it down when it is next brought be-
fore them. With the advent of the Robb and Falzone cases this
goal has come closer to being realized.
76 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at 348.
77 Falzone v. Busch, supra note 5, at 12.
78 Robb v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4, at 711.
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